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RELEVANT RULES CITED 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 59: New Trials; Amendments of Judgment 
(a) Grounds, Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new 
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and 
direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury 
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or 
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to 
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a 
result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or suprise, which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadeouate damages, appearing- to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than ten days after the entry of the judgment. 
iii 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for 
a new trial is made under subdivision (1), (2), (3), or (4), it 
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new 
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion. The opposing party has ten days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which 
the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be 
extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by 
the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written 
stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than ten days after 
entry of judgment the court o^ its own initiative may order a new 
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial 
on motion or a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than ten days 
after entry of the judgment. 
iv 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
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Defendant-Respondent . 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal No. 20723 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court err or abuse its discretion in denying 
appellantTs Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative 
To Amend the Judgment of the parties* Decree of Divorce, where 
that judgment incorporated the provisions of the parties1 
settlement agreement? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is a divorce action in which Mrs. Elton, the 
plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter "appellant") appeals the Order 
of the Court below denying her Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial or 
in the alternative To Amend the Judgment of the parties Decree of 
Divorce. 
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2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The appellant was awarded a Decree of Divorce 
incorporating the parties1 settlement agreement reached at the 
time set for trial of the parties1 consolidated causes of action 
for divorce on March 19, 1985. Addendum at A25-30. The Decree of 
Divorce as prepared by appellant's attorney was entered on April 
16, 1985, and shortly thereafter appellant retained other counsel 
and filed her Motion For a New Trial or in the alternative To 
Amend the Judgment of her Decree of Divorce pursuant to Rule 
59(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Addendum at 
A31-34. 
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
On May 20, 1985, the court below heard proffers of 
evidence and argument on appellant's alternative motion, received 
and reviewed the transcript of the divorce hearing, and denied 
appellant's Motion For New Trial or in the alternative To Amend 
the Judgment of her Decree of Divorce. Addendum at A69-70. The 
appellant appeals the Order of the court below denying her 
alternative Motion. 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
At the time set for trial of the parties' 
consolidated causes of action for divorce on March 19, 1985, both 
parties appeared with counsel before the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, Judge of the District Court in Tooele County, prepared 
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to try their cases on the merits. Addendum at A 2, 51, 
24; T. of March 19, 1985 at 2, T. of May 20, 1985 at 9, 24. 
Counsel for Mr. Elton, the defendant-respondent (hereinafter 
nrespondentn) had arrived at the court before Judge Rigrtrup and 
upon the judge!s arrival engaged in social discourse unrelated to 
the partiesT case. Addendum at A 40-41; Addendum at A 53-54, A 
56-57, T. of May 20, 1985 at 11-12, 14-15. 
Following conference in chambers between the court 
below and counsel for both parties, in which the various issues 
were discussed, the parties entered into negotiations with 
counsel and reached a settlement agreement disposing of all 
pending issues. Addendum at A 2, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2; 
Addendum at A51, A57, T. of May 20, 1985 at 9, 15. The parties 
with their attorneys then came before the Court below and 
appellant's attorney read the parties1 detailed settlement 
agreement into the record in appellant's presence. Addendum at 
A 2-11, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2-11; Addendum at A 39-40. The 
settlement agreement was stated in clear and certain terms. 
Appellant voiced no objections to the terms, nor indicated in 
any manner that she did not understand the agreement in all 
particulars or desired to continue the trial hearing for any 
reason. Addendum at A2, A4, T. of May 20, 1985 at 2, 4; Addendum 
at A40. As the settlement agreement was read into the record, 
appellant interjected more than once as to the particulars of the 
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settlement agreement, expressed her continuing comprehension of 
the terms of the settlement agreement. Addendum at A4-5, A8, 
A10, T. of March 19, 1985 at 4-5, 8, 10; Addendum at A40; 
Addendum at A51-53, T. of May 20, 1985 at 9-11. When aopellant's 
attorney concluded reading the settlement agreement into the 
record and in response to the specific questions asked of her by 
the Court below, appellant specifically indicated that she had 
heard the agreement and clearly expressed her understanding of 
the terms of the settlement and her agreement to be bound by 
those terms. Addendum at A-ll, T. of March 19, 1985 at 11; 
Addendum at A51, A53, T. of May 20, 1985 at 9, 11; Addendum at 
A39-40. Immediately thereafter, the respondent and his attorney 
were excused from the proceedings and upon appellant's testimony 
as to jurisdiction and grounds she was awarded a Decree of 
Divorce. Addendum at A12-13, T. of March 19, 1985 at 12-13. 
Appellant's attorney prepared the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, which were approved 
by respondent's attorney and signed and entered by the court 
below on April 16, 1985. These final documents approved and 
incorporated the parties' settlement agreement as read into the 
record on March 19, 1985 by providing for the distribution of 
the parties' property and awarding neither party alimony, among 
other things. Addendum at A15-30. 
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Shortly thereafter the appellant retained new counsel 
and filed her Motion For a New Trial or in the alternative To 
Amend the Judgment of her Decree of Divorce as provided by Rule 
59(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Addendum at 
A31-34. In support of her motion appellant alleged, basically, 
that she did not hear or agree to the settlement agreement, that 
there were unfair irregularties in the proceedings, that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the judgment distributing 
the parties1 property, and an abuse of discretion in failing to 
award her any alimony. Addendum at A31-37. Upon hearing 
appellant's Motion, the court below determined there was no 
irregularity or abuse of discretion, suprise or new evidence 
supporting appellant's Motion and that there was no substantial 
basis for granting a new trial or amending the judgment. 
Addendum at A66, A67, T. of May 20, 1985 at 24, 25. Accordingly, 
the court below entered its Order denying appellant's motion for 
a new trial or in the alternative to amend the judgment. 
Addendum at A69-70. 
SUMMARY OF ARGDMENT 
Although appellant is dissatisfied with the ruling of 
the Court below denying her motion for a new trial or in the 
alternative to amend the judgment of her Decree of Divorce, that 
court was in an advantageous position to receive the evidence 
presented, and to become acquainted with the parties' problems 
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and the totality of the circumstances relating to the issues. 
Despite the subjective dissatisfaction 0* one party to a divorce 
action, unless there is a clear showing of misapplication of the 
law or abuse of discretion, then the ruling of the trail court in 
awarding a Decree of Divorce should not be disturbed. Eastman v. 
Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976). This standard does not 
significantly vary where the court below has had the opportunity 
to reconsider its judgment upon a Rule 59 motion for a new trial 
or in the alternative to amend the judgment. The ruling of the 
court below will be disturbed only where there is a clear abuse 
of discretion. Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981). 
In the present case, appellant has utterly failed to 
show a misapplication of the law or a clear abuse of discretion 
by the court below. Although divorce proceedings are equitable 
in nature, when a decree of divorce is based upon a property 
settlement sanctioned by the court, equity is not available to 
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away. 
Only under the most compelling circumstances will there be an 
abrogation of such an agreement and the judgment based thereon. 
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); Despain v. Despain, 
610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980). The question as to whether appellant 
agreed to and should be bound by her settlement agreement was one 
for the trial court to determine within its descretion. Klein v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975). 
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Here, the evidence clearly shows that appellant could 
have litigated any issues of alimony and property, but instead 
entered into a settlement agreement at the time set for trial of 
those issues. She heard, understood, and consented to be bound 
by the terms of her settlement agreement. That settlement 
agreement was accepted and approved by the court below under 
circumstances where the trial court had an opportunity to 
consider the representations of the parties1 counsel on the 
issues to be litigated. The Decree of Divorce incorporated the 
parties' settlement agreement. Though appellant asserts a 
grossly disproportionate division of the parties1 assets, her 
assertion is unfounded and the evidence fails to show that the 
division was unfair. There are simply no compelling reasons to 
disturb the sanctity of appellant?s settlement agreement or the 
judgment of the court below incorporating the same. The court 
below properly exercised its discretion, in view of the evidence 
presented, in refusing to abrogate the provisions of appellant's 
settlement agreement. 
Nor does the weight of the evidence presented to the 
court below support any ground for a new trial or an amendment of 
the Decree of Divorce. There was clearly no irregularity in the 
divorce proceedings or abuse of discretion by the Court below 
which might have prevented appellant from having a fair hearing 
on the issues had she chosen to do so. Although appellant 
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asserted a physical disability as grounds for her Rule 59 Motion, 
there is firm evidence that the disability was know by appellant 
prior to trial and in no way interfered with her opportunity for 
a fair hearing. Further, the parties' assets were known to 
appellant prior to the day of trial in this matter, and though 
appellant now disputes their values she had ample opportunity 
to determine their value prior to trial and could have produced 
evidence as to their values at that time. Any accident or 
suprise to appellant could with ordinary prudence have been 
guarded against. Any newly discovered evidence could with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at trial 
had appellant chosen to do so. 
Appellant's attempted analogy between summary 
proceedings and consent judgments is misplaced and there is no 
authority at law to support it. Appellant had her opportunity 
to fully litigate any issues in dispute but on the day of trial 
chose instead to enter into a settlement agreement disposing of 
all issues. This is sufficient evidence justifying the judgment 
of the court below. The decision of the trial court is in accord 
with the law in upholding the sanctity of settlement agreements 
and judgments based thereon. Land, supra; Despain, supra. 
Appellant has not met her burden of showing 
misapplication of the law. Further, she has utterly failed to 
show a clear abuse of discretion to such a decree that the 
8 
judgment of the Court below and its Order denying appellant her 
Rule 59 motion are manifestly unfair and inequitable, 
ARGDMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONSIDERED AWARD AND ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE 
PRESUMED PROPER AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ABSENT A CLEAR 
SHOWING BY APPELLANT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
OR WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
It is clear from appellant1s brief that she is 
dissatisfied with Judgre Rigtrup's Order denying her Motion For a 
New Trial or in the alternative To Amend the Judgment of her 
Decree of Divorce. That Decree of Divorce, however, approved and 
incorporated the provisions of her settlement agreement, with 
which appellant has evidently become dissatisfied and in effect 
now desires to revise. It is not unusual that a party to the 
inherently stressful process of divorce becomes dissatisfied 
with the rulings of the trial court, however that fact alone is 
not indicative of the propriety and merits of those rulings. 
This Court has on innumerable occasions held that where 
a divorce action is equitable in nature, the ruling of the trial 
judge is favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy. 
It is only in those few instances in which the appellant can 
clearly demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion or misappli-
cation of law, such that the orders of the trial court are 
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inequitable in light of the circumstances of the case, that the 
considered judgment of the trial judge will be disturbed. Such 
a position is logically grounded upon the advantaged position of 
the trial court, which has observed the witnesses, received 
evidence presented on the issues and become acquainted with the 
parties problems and the circumstances relating to the issues. 
As observed in Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976): 
We have many times stated that even though 
proceedings in divorce cases are equitable, 
in which this Court may review the evidence, 
due to the prerogative and advantaged position 
of the trial court, we give considerable 
deference to his findings and judgment; and 
we do not disturb them unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary, or he 
has abused his discretion or misapplied 
principles of law. 
558 P.2d at 516 (footnote citation omitted). 
In view of the considerable discretion accorded to the trial 
judge and this Court's requirements that a clear abuse of 
discretion or misapplication of law be demonstrated as a 
condition precedent to any substitution of the trial judge's 
ruling, the burden is on the party dissatisfied with the trial 
court's decision to demonstrate such error. English v. English, 
565 P. 2d 409 (Utah 1977). As recently summarized in Christensen 
v. Christensen, 628 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1981): 
On review, this Court will accord considerable 
deference to the judgment of the trial court 
due to its advantaged position and will not 
disturb the action of that court unless the 
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evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, or the trial court abused its 
discretion or misapplied principles of law... 
628 P.2d at 1299 (footnote citation omitted). 
Nor does this standard of review significantly vary 
merely because appellant faults the decision of the trial court 
in denying a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or in the alternative 
to amend its judgment. As stated in Lembach v. Cox, 639 P. 2d 
197 (Utah 1981): 
...the trial court has a broad discretion... 
and...his ruling...should not be overturned 
unless it appears that his action was 
arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed 
any reasonable bounds of discretion. 
639 P.2d at 201 (footnote citation omitted). 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court below is 
presumed valid and will not be disturbed unless appellant has 
demonstrated that the trial judge has misapplied relevant law to 
such a degree that the Orders are manifestly unfair and 
inequitable or has so clearly abused his discretion as to result 
in substantial prejudice. 
POINT II APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING MISAPPLICATION OF LAW OR CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION; 
THEREFORE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER ENTERED BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
IN THEIR ENTIRETY. 
Appellant, though clearly dissatisfied with the rulings 
entered by Judge Rigtrup, utterly fails to demonstrate a 
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misapplication of law rendering the judgment of the Court below 
manifestly unfair or such a clear abuse of discretion resulting: 
in substantial prejudice. 
As this Court has held in Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 
1248 (Utah 1980): 
.•.when a decree is based upon a property settle-
ment agreement, forged by the parties and 
sanctioned by the Court, equity must take such 
agreement into consideration. Equity is not 
available to reinstate rights and privileges 
voluntarily contracted away simply because one 
has come to regret the bargain made. 
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Court where a property 
settlement is incorporated into the decree, 
and the outright abrogation of the provisions 
of such an agreement is only resorted to with 
great reluctance and for compelling reasons. 
605 P.2d at 1251 (footnote citation omitted). Despain v. 
Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980). 
Although appellant asserts in her Brief that she has 
not had her day in court (Brief of Appellant at 10, 11) she was 
clearly accorded a full opportunity to litigate every pending 
issue of her cause of action on the day of trial, including those 
of alimony and property. Both parties appeared before the trial 
court on that date with the benefit of counsel. Addendum at 
A2, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2; Addendum at A51, A66, T. of May 
20, 1985 at 9, 24. Instead of proceeding through trial, however, 
appellant entered into negotiations through her attorney and 
reached a settlement agreement disposing of all pending issues 
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including those of alimony and property. Addendum at A2, T. of 
March 19, 1985 at 2; Addendum at A51, A59, T. of May 20, 1985 at 
9, 15. This settlement agreement was sanctioned by the trial 
court and incorporated in appellantfs Decree of Divorce. See 
Addendum at A15-30. 
Nor are there any compelling reasons why appellant's 
settlement agreement as incorporated into the Decree of Divorce 
should be abrogated. Appellant heard, understood and assented to 
the settlement agreement without reservation. She was present 
with her attorney at the time her settlement agreement was read 
into the record. Addendum at A2-13, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2-13; 
Addendum at A39-40. The agreement was stated in clear and 
precise terms. Appellant interjected more than once as to the 
particulars of the agreement and otherwise indicated her 
continuing comprehension of the terms of the agreement. She 
voiced no objections nor expressed any confusion. Addendum at 
A4-5, 8, 10, T. of March 19, 1985 at 4-5, 8, 10; Addendum at A2; 
Addendum at A51-53, T. of May 20, 1985 at Q-ll. Although 
appellant asserted in her motion for a new trial or in the 
alternative to amend the judgment that she did not hear the 
proceedings due to a hearing impairment and did not agree to 
the settlement agreement as read into the record, the transcript 
belies her assertion: 
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THE COURT: Mrs. Elton, I assume you!ve heard 
what's been read into the record? 
MRS. ELTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand those terms? 
MRS. ELTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you agree to be bound by 
those terms? 
MRS. ELTON: Yes. 
Addendum at All; T. of March 19, 1985 at 11. The question as to 
whether appellant agreed to and should be bound by her settlement 
agreement was one for the trial court to determine. Klein v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975). Clearly under the facts in the 
present case the trial court properly acted within its descretion 
in refusing to abrogate the settlement agreement or alter its 
judgment. 
Further, as noted in Klein, supra: 
It is the established rule that a stipulation 
pertaining to matters of divorce and property 
rights therein, though advisory upon the Court 
and would usually be followed unless the Court 
thought it unfair or unreasonable, is not 
necessarily binding on the Court anyway. It 
is only a recommendation to be adhered to if 
the Court believes it to be fair and reasonable. 
544 P.2d at 476 (footnote citation omitted). 
Here, on the day of trial and before the parties 
entered into their settlement agreement, the trial court was 
apprised of the outstanding issues through a pre-trial conference 
with the parties1 attorneys. Addendum at A2, T. of March 19, 
14 
1985 at 2. Details relating to distribution of the parties' 
property were discussed, and afterwards the settlement agreement 
was reached and read into the record. Addendum at A58-59, T. of 
May 20, 1985 at 15-16. The settlement agreement was approved by 
the Court below and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce. In 
this context the Court below was in an advantageous position to 
consider the fairness of the settlement agreement in view of 
representations by counsel for the parties at the pre-trial 
conference. It was appropriate for the court below to consider 
what was contained in the settlement agreement in addition to 
what counsel represented on the issues as part of the totality 
of the circumstances in determining what will be a just and 
equitable decree. Klein, supra at 476. Obviously the trial 
court did not view the settlement agreement as unreasonable. 
Rather, he approved it and ordered it incorporated into the 
Decree of Divorce. 
Having a further opportunity to reconsider its decision 
upon appellant's post-trial motion, the trial court was not 
convinced by appellant's proffers and supporting affidavits that 
there were other compelling reasons to abrogate the settlement 
agreement or alter its judgment. Clearly, appellant had every 
opportunity to litigate issues of alimony and property at trial, 
had she desired to do so. Although appellant in her brief 
argrues she has suffered a reduced earning capacity due to a 
15 
hearing loss during the marriage which places her in risk of 
becoming a public charge (Brief of Appellant at 6-7), the record 
is devoid of any evidence to corroberate her self-serving 
allegations which were disputed by respondent• Appellant admits 
she was hearing-impaired prior to the parties marriage. Addendum 
at A49, T. of May 20, 1985 at 7. It was undisputed that she was 
unemployed at the time of her marriage, receiving disability for 
her hearing impairment, and is now capable of employment and 
involved in her family's investment affairs. In addition, she 
receives a monthly income from the parties' settlement agreement. 
Addendum at A54-55, T. of May 20, 1985 at 273* There was no 
compelling reason to alter the Court's order relating to alimony. 
Neither was there a compelling reason to alter the distribution 
of the parties' property. Although appellant argues a great 
disparity in the award, primarily by isolating from the total 
assets a certain parcel of real property the value of which was 
disputed (Addendum at A46, T. of May 20, 1985 at 4), she failed 
to consider the value of other assets she received in relation 
to the total assets available for distribution between the 
parties, together with the value of premarital assets and 
inheritance. Addendum at A50, A54-55, A61, A64-65, T. of May 
20, 1985 at 8, 12-13, 19, 22-23. The appellant had the 
opportunity to litigate the issue of property at trial, the court 
below considered the property values prior to the parties' 
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settlement agreement, and its distribution again upon appellant's 
Rule 59 Motion. The court below was not convinced of any great 
disparity in the distribution, nor does the evidence clearly 
indicate any great disparity. Addendum at A57, A58-59, A61, T. 
of May 20, 1985 at 15, 16-17, 19. The court below, consistent 
with the latitude of discretion to which it is accorded, nroperly 
refused to abrogate the parties1 settlement agreement. 
Nor was there a clear abuse of discretion by the court 
below in denying appellant's motion for a new trial or in the 
alternative to amend the judgment. Appellant has failed to 
establish any irregularity in the proceedings of the court 
below which prevented her from having a fair trial. The evidence 
clearly showed that the f!irregularityn in the proceedings of 
March 19, 1985 as alleged by appellant in support of her motion 
was merely courteous social discourse between respondent's 
counsel and the court below, resulting from an unanticipated 
encounter by respondent's counsel with the trial judge and 
entirely unrelated to the proceedings between the parties. 
Addendum at A53-54, A56-57, T. of May 20, 1985 at 11-12, 14-15; 
Addendum at A2-3. There was no accident or suprise which 
appellant could not have guarded against. Her hearing impairment 
had existed for years. Addendum at A49, T. of May 20, 1985 at 7. 
She knew prior to the proceedings on March 19, 1985 that her 
hearing aid was malfunctioning and that she had an ear infection. 
17 
Addendum at A36. The trial date had been set for several weeks 
and her attorney was present at the proceedings to represent her 
interests. She could have communicated her inability to go 
forward with the proceedings or requested a continuance, but she 
did neither. Addendum at A66, T. of May 20, 1985 at 24. 
Contrary to appellant's claimed inability to hear at her trial 
proceeding as grounds for a new trial or amendment of the 
judgment under Rule 59, the record discloses that appellant 
heard, understood, and agreed to the terms of her settlement 
agreement. Addendum at All, T. of March 19, 1985 at 11. The 
evidence clearly disputed appellant's assertion of accident or 
suprise. 
The record is also devoid of any evidence of newly 
discovered evidence which could not with reasonable diligence 
have been discovered or produced for trial. If, as appellant 
asserts, her hearing impairment worsened during the course of her 
marriage, then any such evidence was known to her prior to her 
trial date and could have been produced at that time. Appellant 
does not claim the parties owned any assets which were unknown to 
her at the time of trial and all of the parties' assets were 
itemized and distributed in the Decree of Divorce. At this late 
date, and evidently based on her sole opinion, she merely 
attempts to dispute the value of those assets, an issue which 
appellant had ample opportunity during the discovery process of 
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her divorce action to determine and an opportunity to establish 
at trial. Her opinion valuation of the assets was disputed by 
respondent, and through expert testimony he was prepared at trial 
to establish the value of those assets. Addendum at A50-51, A66, 
T. of May 20, 1985 at 8-9, 24. Appellant clearly could have 
discovered and produced at trial al] evidence relating to the 
parties1 property. Under similar circumstances this Court has 
upheld the decision of the trial court in denying appellant's 
Rule 59 motion. Clissold v. Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 
241 (1974); Tangero v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 
(1960). 
The evidence is clearly sufficiently to justify the 
judgment of the court below. Where appellant, in the presence 
of the trial court and with the benefit of her attorney 
participated in reaching a settlement agreement, heard the 
agreement, understood it, and agreed to be bound by it. Addendum 
at A4-5, A8, A10-11, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2, 4-5, 8, 10-11. 
The court below was justified in entering its judgment upon 
appellant's stipulation. Though appellant argues in her brief 
that judgment in a divorce proceeding, as to which all issues in 
dispute have been stipulated, is a summary proceeding attaining 
the status of a summary judgment, her attempted analogy is 
misplaced and has no basis at law. There were no facts or other 
issues disputed at the divorce trial in this matter; there was 
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instead an agreement settling the pending litigation. Since no 
genuine issue of material fact existed, or was claimed to exist, 
it was entirely appropriate for the court below to enter its 
judgment in conformity with the parties' agreement. In reviewing 
the rulings of the court below the standard to be applied by this 
Court is not, nor could it be, whether a genuine issue of 
material fact existed at trial. Clearly there were none. 
Rather, the standard is whehter the court below clearly abused 
its discretion in denying appellant's Rule 59 alternative motion. 
As clearly shown, supra, the trial judge properly exercised his 
broad discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial or 
to amend the judgment previously entered. 
CONCLDSION 
In divorce cases this Court has invariably held that 
the decision of the trial judge is to be respected unless it 
clearly appears that he has abused his discretion or manifestly 
misapplied relevant law to the substantial prejudice of the 
appealing party. This standard does not significantly vary where 
the court below has had the opportunity to reconsider its 
judgment upon a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or in the 
alternative to amend the judgment. It appropriately grants 
deference to the advantaged position of the trial judge who has 
received evidence presented on the issues and become acquainted 
20 
with the parties, their problems, and the circumstances relating 
to the issues. 
Appellant's present dissatisfaction with the judgment 
of the trial court and its ruling denying her Rule 59 alternative 
motion is neither an appropriate nor sufficient ground for 
reversal of the trial court's orders. The court below 
appropriately applied relevant law on the issues and did not 
agree that appellant was justified in seeking to reopen its 
judgment. Nowhere does appellant isolate an instance in which 
Judge Rigtrupfs judgment, and order denying her motion, 
prejudicially errs against her or is not supported by substantial 
evidence. The evidence clearlv shows that appellant heard, 
understood, participated in, and agreed to be bound by the terms 
of her settlement agreement with the full benefit of legal 
representation and an opportunity to litigage any issues had she 
chosen to do so. The judgment of the court below which approved 
and incorporated appellant's settlement agreement cannot be 
legitimately analogized with that of a summary iudgment where 
factual issues are in dispute and the question of whether there 
were disputed facts is on review. Here there were no disputed 
issues at trial. It was clearly within the trial court's 
discretion to determine whether appellant understood and agreed 
to the settlement agreement, and there was clearly substantial 
evidence that she did so. 
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Nor are there any compelling reasons shown by appellant 
to support an abrogation of her settlement agreement and the 
judgment of the trial court entered in conformity with that 
agreement. Appellant had unequivocably agreed to the 
distribution of the parties1 assets and did not seek alimony. 
She should not now, upon settling all issues at trial, be 
accorded a second opportunity for trial simply because she has 
come to regret her decision. 
In reconsidering its judgment, the court below properly 
exercised its broad discretion in denying appellantTs Rule 59 
motion. The evidence clearly shows there was no irregularity in 
the divorce proceedings, abuse of discretion, accident, sunrise, 
or new (and previously unavailable) evidence which prevented 
appellant from proceeding through a fair trial had she chosed to 
do so, or which rendered the court's judgment unfair. Her valid 
settlement agreement was a sufficient basis upon which the trial 
court could enter its judgment and it clearly was not error in 
law to do so. Appellant simply failed to establish any grounds 
sufficient for a new trial or an amended judgment. The decision 
of the court below denying appellant's Rule 59 motion should be 
affirmed, and the judgment reflected by the parties1 Decree of 
Divorce and based on their settlement agreement should be upheld. 
22 
There is no manifest injustice or clear abuse of discretion in 
this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of January, 1986. 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
B. L. DART 
JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 
1986, I hand delivered four copies of the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief to: 
William B. Parsons, III 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 



























IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 






BE IT REMEMBERED: That the above-entitled matter 
came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of March, 1985J 
at the hour of 11:15 a.m., before the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of 
the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
sitting without a jury, and the following proceedings were 
had. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
E. H. Fankhauser, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
660 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Ucah 
B. L. Dart, Esq. 
310 South Main," Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
6AY12 B. CAMPESIL 
fittNNSO SHORTHAND REPORTER 
* fiALT lAKc CITY, UTAH 





2 (The Court having conferred with counsel off the 
3 record, the following proceedings were had in chambers 
4 at 11:15 a.m.) 
5 THE COURT: This is the time and place set 
6 for the hearing in the matter of Joan H. Elton versus 
7 Curtis Beck Elton, 84-347 and 84-348, which cases were 
3 consolidated. The record may show that plaintiff is present 
9 in person and is represented by E. H. Fankhauser, that 
10 defendant is present in person and is represented by B. L, 
H j Dart. 
The Court has discussed the various issues with 
13 J counsel, and the parties hcive discussed the issues with 
14 I their attorneys. The Court is advised that the parties have 
a settlement in this case. Is that true? 
16 I MR. FANKHAUSER: Yes, your Honor. 
17 MR. DART: Yes, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Would you please state what the « 
19 settlement is? 
t i 
20 I MR. FANKHAUSER: Okay. Correct me if I'm ; 
21 I wrong, Bert. The plaintiff, Mrs. Elton, would receive, free ! 
I i 
22 j and clear of any claims of Mr. Elton, the residence she 
owned before marriage at 280 Mar Visca in Tooele, subject 
24 I to the balance of the mortgage indebtedness owing thereon. 






She will receive all of the furniture and furnish-] 
ings, appliances and personal property in her possession, 
located at the home, with some exceptions, and we'll note 
those later• She will receive her '69 Corvette automobile 
owned before marriage, 
THE COURT: 1969 Corvette? 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Correct, All of the ten 
shares of American Western Insurance that she owned before 
marriage. She will receive a 1981 Toyota pickup truck with 
the shell, subject to the balance owing to the Tooele 
Federal Credit Union, which she will assume and pay and 
hold Mr. Elton harmless. 
THE COURT: Toyota truck? 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Yes. And she will hold 
Mr. Elton harmless on that. 
THE COURT: As I understand it, you are co-
signed on that loan; is that correct:? 
18 : MR, ELTON: I went down tz the credit union, 4 
!3 I and they said that than lean has beer, paid eff. I presume 
chat she refinanced it. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: She refinanced it, so 
there's no problem with that. She will receive the 118 
shares of Pacific Gas & Electric stock. 
24 I THE COURT: How many shares? 
25 MR. DART: It's 100 shares of Pacific Gas & 
A-3 
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Electric redeemable preferred, and 18 shares of common, 
MR. FANKHAUSER: I was going to break that 
down. She would receive that as part of the distribution 
of the retirement account, or Mr. Elton's IRA account with 
the Tooele Federal Credit Union. That will be transferred 
over to her. She will also receive two of the lots at 
Gold Hill town site. Which two do you want? 
MR. DART: We just thought we would set it 
up — are they all four together? 
MR. ELTON: No. I purchased them so that I 
own a little corner of each major lot. They are spread 
out. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: There's two in Block C 
and two in Block D. 
MR. ELTON: They are not adjacent. Any two 
that she would like. 
MRS. ELTON: Wait until I talk to ~ 
THE COURT: Plaintiff to have choice. 
MRS. ELTON: Can I stipulate which ones 
later? I haven't even seen the area. 
MR. DART: That choice to be made within 30 
days, otherwise she can have "C" and he have "D". 
THE COURT: You can run an ad in the Wall 
Street Journal to — i 
MR. FANKHAUSER: This is out by Fish Springs, 
A-4 
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out in that area. 
MR- FANKHAUSER: Do you understand what hers 
saying? You get your choice within 30 days, otherwise 
he'll get the tv/o in Block C and you will get the two in 
Block D. 
MRS. ELTON: It was my understanding they 
were right in Wendover. 
MR. ELTON: They are south of Wendover. 
MR. DART: How far south of Wendover is this 
property? 
MR. ELTON: It is south of Wendover by 
probably 50 miles. It's in that Fish Springs-Calio area. 
MR. DART: He only paid $80 apiece for them. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Okay. That's two lots. 
Right. ; 
In addition, Mr. Elton will pay to Mrs. Elton as ' 
i 
her share of the real properties, principally her home and 
the triplex, $10,000 payable at the rate of S300 a month 
wich 10% interest, and than is zz be secured by a mortgage 
lien on the triplex until paid* 1 
MR. DART: It's $3 00 per month or more. He 
can prepay that. 
MR- FANKHAUSER: Yes, because it's a division 




She will retain her own personal property, cloth-
ing, jewelry and effects. 
Mr. Elton will then be awarded the 1978 Toyota 
i 
i 
land cruiser, the 1978 Chev pickup v/ith camper. As I under-
stand it, he has a one-third interest in that? 
THE COURT: '78 Toyota. 
MR. DART: Land cruiser. 
THE COURT: Next item. 
MR. DART: "78 Chevrolet pickup. He has a 
third interest on it, with camper. He owns a third of a 
i 
•53 Wxlley's jeep, and he owns a Chevrolet Vega that he ; 
I 
owned before the marriage. And he owns ah interest in a — 
t 
\ 
THE COURT: What was after the jeep? S 
i 
MR. DART: A Chevrolet Vega, owned before J 
i 
marriage. Then there1s an '85 Chevrolet van, subject to the 
loan obligation owing against it. He further would be 
awarded his retirement in the United States Government. He 
will be awarded the triplex free and clear zt any clai~ of 
che plainciff. Well, there's no balance. Thac finally goc 
paid off. Subject only to her lien for her property settle-
ment. 
THE COURT: What do you want, a note and ; i 
t 
trust deed for your security? j 
MR. DART: Itfs in joint tenancy currently, 
and we would like to either — 
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THE COURT: Deed out subject to — 
MR- DART: Deed out subject to that, then 
have another quit-claim deed held subject to when the 
balance is paid. 
They will each of them be awarded their own 
checking accounts or savings accounts that they may have. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: She is awarded the building 
materials that she has in her possession. 
MR. DART: And there's a bedroom set that 
was owned by his mother, and also a washer and dryer that 
are located in his residence that will be awarded to him. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Those were the items that 
came from his mother's property. 
THE COURT: What did you say besides the 
dresser and — 
MR. FANKHAUSER: A washing machine. 
MR. DART: One thing we have net discussed 
is that there are some currently outstanding charge ace sunns, 
and we would agree to assume and pay the Master Charge and 
the Visa. I think the ether should be assurrec by her. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: We would agree to take the 
Penney's. 
THE COURT: Defendant to pay Visa? 
MR. DART: And Master Charge. 
THE COURT: And Master Charge. And all 
/ 
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others except as specifically mentioned? 
MR. DART: No. Our concern is that there are' 
some that we didn't know about, including the ones he's 
talking about. So those were the only ones incurred | 
specifically during the marriage that we would assume. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: There is a Penney*s that 
she will assume, then Sears. 
MR. DART: Montgomery Ward. Those are the 
only three, aren't they? 
MRS. ELTON: That's it. 
MR. DART: Each to pay own after separation 
i 
in July of 1984. j 
i 
THE COURT: July 1, 1984. : 
MR. DART: Defendant will agree to pay j 
a portion of plaintiff's attorney's fees in the sum of ; 
$750, to be paid within 30 days from the entry of the de-
i 
cree. And there is to be no alimony awarded. • 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Did ycu say he got the boat 
I meter and trailer also? 
MR. DART: I said all vehicles in his posses-
sion or personal property in his possession-
MR. FANKHAUSER: And the Honda motorcycle? 
MR. DART: And the same for whatever she . 
has. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: He recently purchased a home 
A-8 
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also, your Honor, and I don't remember the address. 
MR. DART: That's located at 291 East Broad-
way, and he will be awarded than subject to any liabilities 
owing against it, free of any claims of Mrs. Elton. 
THE COURT: West Broadway? 
MR. DART: East Broadway, Further, each of 
them would be awarded any inheritance that they have not 
yet received or would anticipate receiving from their own 
parents. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Free and clear of any claims 
of the other. 
MR. DART: I think that covers it. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: I think that does. 
MR. DART: One other thing that he had pre-
marriage are some Scotch whiskey futures, v/hich he will 
retain subject to any obligation owing on that. I think 
that's it. 
As part cf the stipulation, the defendant vculc 
v/ithdraw his complaint filed in a ccr.panicn acticr. which 
was served as an answer and counterclaim in this action, 
and consent that his default be entered and that the plain-
tiff be awarded a divorce on her grounds of mental cruelty. 
We would request, in light of the fact that there 
are no children as issue of the marriage, the length of 





















in place but not yet at law, I don't suppose, that the d e -
cree of divorce be made final on entry. ; 
THE COURT: It usually takes a pie to get 
that accomplished. 
MR. DART: Would you like a doughnut? 
THE COURT: All right. What happens with 
respect to the '84 tax returns? 
MR. DART: They have not been filed, and it 
would be his intention to file separately. We've had some 
problems getting some records, and it would be his desire 
to do that. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Do you want to file 
separately? 
MRS. ELTON: Yes. 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Okay. If you need some 
information, let me know, Bert, and I'll be glad to help 
you out. 
THE COURT: Each zo sicr. necessary iccumencs. 
,0 ' \ro ~\zzf 
2Q . MR. FANKHAUSER: Each cc execute any and all 





THE COURT: Mr. Eicon, you have heard what's 
been read into the record, have you not? 
MR. ELTON: Yes. 




















MR. ELTON: Y e s , I d o . 
THE COURT: Do you agree to be bound by those 
i 
terms? 
MR. ELTON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Elton, I assume you've heard; 
what's been read into the record? 
MRS. ELTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand those terms? 
MRS. ELTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you agree to be bound by those 
terms? 
MRS. ELTON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. FAMKHAUSER: Reluctantly, but yes. i 
THE COURT: If you win, you do the drafting. ! 
i 
MR. FANKHAUSER: Well, I hate to do the ! 
i 
drafting, but I guess I'd better. They would up the at- ! 








MR. DART: I'll draft them if ycu war.t. 
THE COURT: We'll excuse you, then, and take 
her default. Take a doughnut with you. 
(Whereupon, Mrs. Dart and defendant withcraw.) 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
called as a witness on her own behalf, being 
first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole 
A-ll 
11 
1 truth and nothing but the truth, was examined 
2 and testified as follows: 
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. FANKHAUSER: 
5 Q Would you state your full name for the record? 
6 A Joan Harris Caldwell Elton. 
7 Q How long have you lived in Tooele County? 
3 A All my life. 
g J Q Why do you want a divorce? 
A Because of cruelty. 
Q What kind of cruelty? 
A Every kind, from being smacked in the facef which 
caused me to end up wearing a hearing-aid, which I did not 
wear in the past. 
Q Anything else? 
A I did have a disability retirement, but I didn't 
17 I have to wear it until he smacked me. 
13 j Q Anything else? 
ig [ A That's the main thing. 
20 ! THE COURT: Has that caused you physical and 
2i mental pain and suffering? 
22 I THE WITNESS: Yes, it has. 
THE COURT: Granted final on entry. 
24 I MR. FANKHAUSER: All right. 






























MRS. ELTON: No. I want to keep the name 
Elton. I'm going to keep that name. 
THE COURT: All right. Granted. Good luck 
to you. You can have two doughnuts. 
(Mr. Dart re-enters chambers.) 
MR. DART: Mr. Elton asked if we could have 
an understanding of when the $300 a month starts, and 
apparently he was paying $300 on the prior order. 
l 
THE COURT: Well, the prior order was that he" 
I 
pay four hundred, the four hundred due for February plus 
payable March the 14th. How about the 15th of April and the 
15th of each month thereafter? 
MR. FANKHAUSER: That's all right. You'll ! 
i 
get $300 a month the 15th of each month. ,' 
i 
THE COURT: Commencing Aoril 15th. i 
MR. DART: All right. 
18 | (thereupon, the proceedings were ccr.cluced at 11:30 
i 

















State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Gayle B. Campbell, do hereby certify: 
That I am one of the Official Court Reporters of 
the State of Utah; that on the 19th day of March, 1985, I 
attended the within matter and reported in shorthand the 
proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said short-
hand notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and the fore-j 
going pages, numbered from 1 to 13, inclusive, constitute a 
full, true and correct account of the same to the best of my! 
ability. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this day of 
April, 1985. 
Gayle B. Campbell, 
iri7.issj.cn E x p i r e s : 
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ttorney for Plaintiff 
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Jalt Lake City, Utah 84111 Q^ tfj^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CURTIS BECK ELTON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 84-347 
Consolidated with 
Civil No. 84-348 
Judge Rigtrup 
This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the above 
entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on March 19, 1985, before the 
Honorable Kenneth •. Rigtrup, District Judge. Plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by her attorney, E. H. Fankhauser. 
Defendant was present in person and represented by his attorney, 
Bert L. Dart. The Court held an informal Pre-trial conference 
with counsel in chambers; and the parties thereafter, through their 
respective attorneys, entered into a stipulation concerning all 
of the matters in the above entitled cause of action, which stip-
ulation was read into the record, and acknowledged, accepted and 
approved by the parties hereto, and each of them and their respective 
A-15 
counsel; and, the Defendant having stipulated that his Complaint 
(Civil No. 84-348) consolidated with this action and deemed to 
oe an Answer and Counterclaim, may be withdrawn and his default 
entered to the Complaint of Plaintiff; and the default of Defendant 
having been duly entered by the Court; and the stipulation and 
settlement agreement of the parties having been approved by the 
Court; and the Plaintiff having been sworn and testified in 
support of the allegations of her Complaint on file herein and 
more than ninety (90) days having lapsed since the commencement 
of this action; and the matter having been submitted to the 
Court for its determination and decision; and the Court, being 
fully advised in the premises, does now make and adopt the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff is a resident of Tooele County, State 
of Utah and has been for more than three (3) months prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married December 28, 1977 
at Las Vegas, Nevada. 
3. That no children have been born as issue of the marriage 
between Plaintiff and Defendant and none are expected. 
4. During the marriage relationship Defendant treated 
Plaintiff cruelly causing her to suffer mental distress and nervous 
upset in that the Defendant was very demanding of the Plaintiff 
and critized her in front of family members, relatives and friends; 
-2-
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exhibited a violent temper and verbally and physically abused 
the Plaintiff, all of which acts caused the Plaintiff to suffer 
extreme mental distress and nervous upset to such an extent that 
continuation of the marriage relationship became impossible. 
The parties separated on or about July 1, 1984 and have remained 
separate and apart since said date. The Court finds sufficient 
cause existing for waiving the interlocutory period. 
5. Pursuant to the stipulation entered into between the 
parties, through their respective attorneys, the Plaintiff is 
to be awarded as her sole and separate property, free and clear 
of all claims of the Defendant, the following: 
(a) All personal property owned by Plaintiff prior 
to her marriage to Defendant, including and not limited 
to, furniture, appliances, household furnishings; 1969 
Chevrolet Corvette; 10 shares of common stock in American 
Western Life; her own personal property, clothing, jewelry 
and effects; 
(b) All of the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, 
appliances, housekeeping supplies ahd effects in possession 
of Plaintiff, including and not limited to, microwave oven, 
dishwasher, sewing machine, two color portable television 
sets, all building materials in possession of the Plaintiff; 
her bank accounts in her name; the 1981 Toyota pickup truck, 
subject to the balance of the obligation owing thereon to 
the Tooele Federal Credit Union, which she is to assume 
and pay and hold Defendant harmless; 
A-l3,-
(c) The home and residence in Plaintiff's name 
located at 280 Marvista, Tooele City, Utah, subject 
to the balance of the first mortgage indebtedness owing 
thereon which she is to assume and pay, free and clear 
of any and all claims of the Defendant; two (2) of the 
four (4) lots located in the Gold Hill Townsite, Westward 
Ho Addition, Tooele County, Section 1, Township 8 South, 
Range 18 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Plaintiff 
shall have thirty (30) days from the date of the Decree 
of Divorce to elect which two lots she desires to be 
deeded to her. Should the Plaintiff fail to make the 
election within thirty (30) days from the date of the 
Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff shall be awarded Lots 18 
and 26 of Block D, Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition. 
Defendant will be awarded Lot 17 and 27 of Block C, Gold 
Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition. 
(d) Plaintiff is to be awarded all sums on deposit 
in Defendant's IRA Retirement account with Tooele Federal 
Credit Union, including accumulated interest. Defendant 
is to make arrangements to transfer ownership of the 
account to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is awarded all shares 
of stock presently held by the parties in Pacific Gas 
and Electric comprising 100 shares of preferred stock 
and 18 shares of common stock; 
(e) Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff as her share 
of the equity in and to the tri-plex located at 261 Marvista 
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Lane, Tooele, Utah, the sum of $10,000.00, payable 
at the rate of $300.00 per month with interest of ten (10%) 
percent per annum. Payments are to commence on or before 
April 15, 1985 and on or before the 15th day of each and 
every month thereafter until the entire sum of $10,000,00, 
together with interest at ten (10%) percent per annum is 
paid in full. Plaintiff is to have a first mortgage lien 
on the tri-plex until the entire sum of $10,000.00 is 
paid in full* 
(f) Defendant stipulates and agrees that he will 
pay to Plaintiff to assist her in the payment of her 
attorney's fees the sum of $750.00. Said sum shall be 
payable within thrity (30) days from the date of the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce herein. 
6. Pursuant to the oral stipulation entered into between 
the parties, through their respective attorneys, the Defendant is 
to be awarded as his sole and separate property, free and clear 
of all claims of the Plaintiff, the following: 
(a) The property owned by Defendant before marriage 
to Plaintiff, including and not limited to, the 1976 Vega, 
the Scotch Whiskey Future, proceeds from the sale of 
Jonathan Logan stock, camping equipment, the black & white 
television set, the other items of furniture and appliances 
in his possession, and the proceeds from the sale of his 
home at 990 Coleman Avenue, Tooele, Utah, which proceeds 
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were used to purchase the tri-plex at 261 Marvista Lane, 
Tooele, Utah; his own personal property, clothing, jewelry 
and effects; 
(b) Defendants tools, table saw and drill press; 
the courch and love seat received from his mother; the 
bedroom set received from his mother; the washer and 
dryer received from his mother; the 1985 Chevrolet van, 
subject to the existing loan owing thereon which he is 
to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff harmless; the one-third 
(1/3) interest in the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck with 
camper# subject to the balance of the loan obligation owing 
thereon which Defendant is to assume and pay and hold 
Plaintiff harmless; the one-half (1/2) interest in the 
boat, motor and trailer; the 1978 Toyota Landcruiser; 
the one-third (1/3) interest in the Willy's Jeep; the 
750 Honda motorcycle with trailer; and his Federal 
Retirement account with the United States Government; 
(c) Defendant is to be awarded the tri-plex located 
at 261 Marvista Lane, Tooele, Utah, subject to any and 
all indebtedness and encumbrances owing thereon which 
Defendant is to assume and pay and subject to a first 
mortgage lien in favor of Plaintiff in the sum of 
$10,000.00, which lien is to be payable at the rate of 
$300.00 per month with interest at the rate of ten (10%) 
percent per annum, commencing April 15, 1985 and the 




(d) Two (2) of the lots located at Gold Hill 
Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, subject 
to the option of Plaintiff to elect within thrity (30) 
days which of the two lots she desires to be awarded 
to her. In the event Plaintiff should fail to make 
an election within thrity (30) days from the date of 
the Decree of Divorce, Defendant shall be awarded Lots 
17 and 27 of Block C, Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho 
Addition, Tooele County, Utah. Plaintiff shall be 
awarded Lots 18 and 26 of Block D, Gold Hill Townsite, 
Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah; 
(e) Defendant is to be awarded all right, title 
and interest in and to the home recently purchased by 
him located at 291 East Broadway, Tooele, Utah, subject 
to any and all indebtedness owing thereon which he is 
to assume and pay; 
(f) Defendant, by stipulation, is to be responsible 
to assume and pay the debts and obligations owing to 
GMAC for the 1985 Chevrolet Van, GMAC for the 1978 
pickup truck and camper; First Security Bank loan for 
attorney's fees, Tooele Federal Credit Union for 
Defendant's personal loans; the Elton estate for all 
sums borrowed, Rex Elton; the Mastercard account with 
Tooele Federal Credit Union; and the Visa card account 
at Tooele Federal Credit Union, together with any and 
all other debts and obligations he has incurred since 
separation and hold Plaintiff harmless; 
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(g) Plaintiff stipulates that she will be 
responsible to assume and pay the debts and obligations 
owing to Sears, Wards, J.C. Penneys, her truck loan to 
Tooele Federal Credit Union, and all other debts and 
obligations she has incurred since separation and 
hold Defendant harmless; 
(h) Defendant is awarded his bank accounts in his 
name except for his IRA account with Tooele Federal 
Credit Union which is to be transferred to Plaintiff/ 
(i) Each party stipulates and agrees that they will 
execute any and all documents necessary to carry out the 
transfers and awards of property, real and personal, 
stipulated to, and approved by the Court. 
7. Plaintiff, at the time she married Defendant, was totally 
disabled due to a loss of hearing (Tinnitus) and was receiving 
disability benefits from her former employer, Tooele Ordinance 
Depot. Plaintiff receives disability benefits at the present time 
of $659.00 per month gross. Defendant is employed and working for 
the United States Government at Dugway Proving Grounds and has a 
gross income of $30,000.00 per year. The parties stipulated that 
alimony not be awarded to either party. Under the present circum-
stances, it is reasonable that alimony not be awarded to either 
party. 
8. Plaintiff has in force and effect a hospital and medical 
insurance policy. Defendant has in force and effect through his 
employment, a hospital and medical insurance policy. It is reason-
-8-
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able that each party be required to maintain their own hospital 
and medical insurance policies for their own benefit* 
9. The Court finds that the oral stipulation entered into 
between the parties is reasonable under the present circumstances, 
does hereby approve said stipulation and finds that the same should 
be incorporated in the Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
to be entered herein. 
The Court, having made its Findings of Fact, now concludes 
as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of this matter and of the 
parties. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from 
the Defendant upon the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree 
is to become final upon entry. 
2. That the oral stipulation and property settlement 
agreement submitted to the Court, and duly approved by the Court, 
which stipulation and property settlement agreement is set forth 
in the Findings of Fact hereinabove, is adopted by the Court and 
is expressly incorporated in these Conclusions of Law. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded all of the real and personal 
property stipulated to be awarded to Plaintiff and as set forth 
in the Findings of Facts hereinabove 
4. Defendant should be awarded all of the real and personal 
property stipulated to be awarded Defendant as set forth in the 
-9-
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indings of Fact hereinabove. 
5, Neither party should be awarded alimony. 
6. Each of the parties should be ordered to execute any 
nd all documents necessary to carry out the awards of property 
tipulated to between the parties and as set forth in the Findings 
>f Fact hereinabove; Further, each of the parties should be 
»rdered to deliver those items of property in their possession 
iwarded to the other party. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this /I day of April, 1985. 
BY THE URT: 







B. L. DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
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E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY
 # STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CURTIS BECK ELTON, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 84-347 
Consolidated with 
Civil No. 84-348 
Judge Rigtrup 
This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the 
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on March 19, 198 5, the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff 
was present in person and represented by her attorney, E. H. 
Fankhauser. Defendant was present in person and represented by 
his attorney, Bert L. Dart. The parties, through their respective 
attorneys, entered into a stipulation concerning all of the matter? 
in the above entitled action; and which stipulation was acknowledged# 
accepted and approved by the parties hereto, and which stipulation 
was approved by the Court and ordered to be included in the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce herein; 
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and# the default of Defendant having been duly entered by the 
Court to the Complaint of Plaintiff; and the Plaintiff having 
been duly sworn and testified in support of the allegations of 
her Complaint on file herein; and more than ninety (90) days 
having lapsed since the commencement of this action; and the 
matter having been submitted to the Court for its determination 
and decision; and the Court, having made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and in accordance therewith, now, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS; 
1. That Plaintiff, JOAN ELTON, be and is hereby granted 
a Decree of Divorce from Defendant, CURTIS BECK ELTON, dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony presently existing between Plaintiff and 
Defendant, which Decree of Divorce is to become final upon entry• 
2. Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property, free and clear of all claims of Defendant, 
the following, to-wit: 
(a) The home and residence owned by Plaintiff 
before marriage located at 280 Marvista, Tooele, Utah 
subject to the balance of the mortgage indebtedness 
thereon which he is to assume and pay; 
(b) All furniture, household furnishings, appliances 
and effects in her possession, except for the items 
specifically awarded to Defendant; 
(c) 1969 Corvette owned before marriage; 1981 
Toyota pickup truck, subject to the balance of the 
-2-
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obligation owing thereon to Tooele Federal Credit Union 
which she is to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless; 
(d) Ten (10) shares American Western Insurance 
stock owned before marriage; 118 shares Pacific Gas and 
Electric stock (100 shares preferred, 18 shares common); 
(e) All bank accounts in Plaintiff's name, including 
Plaintifffs IRA account* Defendant's IRA account with 
Tooele Federal Credit Union. Defendant is ordered to 
change over his IRA account to the name of Plaintiff; 
(f) $10,000.00 representing Plaintiff's share of the 
equity in and to the tri-plex property, which sum is to 
be paid out at the rate of $300.00 per month commencing 
on or before April 15, 1985 and the 15th day of each and 
every month thereafter with interest at the rate of ten 
(10%) per annum until paid in full. Plaintiff is to have 
a first mortgage lien on the tri-plex to secure payment 
of this amount; 
(g) All building materials in Plaintiff's possession, 
together her personal property, clothing, jewelry and effects. 
3. Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property, free and clear of all claims of Plaintiff, the 
following, to-wit: 
(a) The tri-plex located at 261 Marvista, Tooele, 
Utah, subject to any and all indebtedness and encumbrances 
thereon which* he is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless and subject to a mortgage lien in favor of 
-3-
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Plaintiff in the sum of $10,000.00 payable at the 
rate of $300.00 per month commencing on or before the 
15th day of April, 1985 and the 15th day of each and 
every month thereafter until paid in full, together with 
interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum; 
(b) The Scotch Futures owned by Defendant before 
marriage; all proceeds from the sale of the Jonathan Logan 
stock; together with Defendant's bank accounts in his 
name, except for Defendant's IRA account with Tooele Federal 
Credit Union, which account and all sums on deposit therein 
is to be awarded to Plaintiff. Defendant is to arrange 
for transfer of the IRA account to the name of Plaintiff; 
(c) 1978 Toyota Landcruiser, one-third (1/3) interest 
in the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck with camper, subject 
to the balance of the indebtedness owing thereon which 
Defendant is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless; the 1985 Chevrolet Van, subject to the indebted-
ness owing thereon which Defendant is to assume and pay 
and hold Plaintiff harmless; one-half (1/2) interest in 
the boat, motor and trailer, the Honda motorcycle with 
trailer, the one-third (1/3) interest in the 1953 Willy's 
Jeep; 1976 Vega owned before marriage; 
(d) The items of furniture, furnishings and appliances 
in possession of Defendant, together with the furniture 
received from his mother consisting of a couch, love seat, 
-4-
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bedroom set, washer and dryer; 
(e) Defendant's retirement account with the 
United States Government, Department of the Army; 
(f) The residence recently purchased located at 
291 East Broadway, Tooele, Utah; 
(g) Defendant's tools, including his table saw 
and drill press and his own personal property, clothing, 
jewelry and effects. 
4. Each of the parties are awarded two of the lots located 
at Gold Hill Townsite, Tooele County, Utah. Plaintiff is to have 
thirty (30) days from the date of the entry of this Decree of 
Divorce to elect which lots she desires to be awarded to her. 
Should Plaintiff fail to elect which lots she desires to be 
awarded to her, Plaintiff will be awarded Lots 18 and 26, Block D, 
Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah; 
and Defendant will be awarded Lots 17 and 27, Block C, Gold Hill 
Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah. 
5. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the balance 
of the mortgage indebtedness owing on her home, the balance of 
the loan obligation owing on the 1981 Toyota pickup truck, Sears, 
Wards, J.C. Penneys and any obligations and debts she has incurred 
since commencing this action and hold Defendant harmless. 
6. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all debts and 
obligations owing on the tri-plex, GMAC on the 1985 Chevrolet Van, 
GMAC on the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck, the obligation owing to 
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Lrst Interstate Visa card, First Interstate Mastercard, his 
»rsonal loans to First Security Bank and Tooele Federal Credit 
lion and all other debts and obligations he has incurred since 
aramencement of this action and hold Plaintiff harmless. 
7. Neither party is awarded alimony. 
8. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sura 
£ $750.00 for theuse and benefit of her attorney to assist her 
a the payment of her attorney's fees and costs. Each party shall 
e responsible to pay the balance, if any, on their own attorney's 
ees and costs incurred in this action. 
9. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to execute any and 
11 documents necessary to carry out the awards of property as 
.et forth herein. 
DATED this / * 
BT 





Approved as to form: ; 
B. L. DART 
Attorney for Defendant 
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WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
1200 University CLub Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-cOo-
JOAN B. ELTON, 
Plaintiff. 
APR 2 9 'dw 
DRT, ADMSN, PRKN & PRCTft 
-vs-
CURTIS BECK ELTON, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 
Civil No. 84-347 
consolidated with 
Civil No. 84-348 
(Judge Rigtrup) 
COMES NOW William B. Parsons III of Salt Lake aty, Utah, and hereby 
enters his appearance as counsel for the Plaintiff Joan H. Elton in the 
above entitled matter. 
DATED this J£S day of _J\ptUX » 1985. 
U>v. \S>. TOA CLKS-Gm. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going was mailed postage prepaid this &<> day of 
to: 
B.L. Dart 
DART, ADAMSCN. PARKEN & PROCTOR 
310 South Main #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
? e 
, 1985, 
Jer/ Gay Carte/, Secreta U 
Secretary 
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WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 RFCF|VFn 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
1200 University Club Building APR 2 9 1985 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Cff-*-••'*. PRKH * PRCJR 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
JOAN H. ELTON, 
P l a i n t i f f . | 
- v s -
CURTIS BECK ELTON, | 
Defendant. 
1 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR 
1 IN THE ALTERNATIVE A MOTION 
1 TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT 
I Civ i l No. 84-347 
i consolidated with 84-348 
i (Judge Rigtrup) 
COMES NCW the Plaintiff by and through her attorney of record William 
B, Parsons III and moves the above pntitled Court in conformity with the 
provisions of Rule 59(a) and 59(e), for a new trial in the divorce proceeding 
between Plaintiff and Defendant or in the alternative for an amended Judgment 
and altered Decree of Divorce• 
She Plaintiff substantiates in part the Motion for a New Trial on the 
provisions of Rule 59(a) (6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and asserts that no 
evidence was taken by formed sworn testimony nor were any documents admitted 
after a foundation was properly laid except the matter of grounds and 
jurisdiction and the general agreement as to understanding by the Plaintiff 
and that the evidence is not in any form sufficient to support the decision 
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or Decree or tne division of property as set forth in said Decree. The 
nature of the agreements between the parties were not because of the 
averments in Plaintiff's Affidavit sufficient to sustain the cVcifO<.*;;• w«! 
determination of the Decree and a division of the property as is e\;V< j.. «><T 1;* 
the Decree is not supported even by the general averments, proffers and 
representations, the nature of the division being excessive in favor of the 
Defendant, prejudicial to the rights of the Plaintiff, and not in the 
interest of justice. 
Rule 59(a) (1-4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, require Affidavits to 
substantiate and support them as foundations for a new trial and the 
Plaintiff has in her Affidavit asserted irregularities in the proceedings 
which prevented her frcra having a fair trial, entitling her to a new trial on 
the merits. 
In the alternative, should the Court not grant a new trial, the 
Plaintiff requests an extension of time in which to supply additional 
Affidavits to evidence such a disproportionate distribution of property 
acquired during the course of the marriage in favor of the Defendant and 
against the Plaintiff's best interest as to entitle the Plaintiff to an 
amendment of the existing Judgment and Decree of Divorce. It is the 
assertion of the Plaintiff that the distribution evidenced by the existing 
Decree so disproportionately favors the Defendant as to not be reasonable, 
prudent or in the interest of justice and as to not otherwise be justified 
based upon the evidence or proffers made at the time of the original hearing. 
DATED this S6 day of r4/l^_y , 1985. 
JO**-
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICAIE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going was mailed postage prepaid this as day of AJLIJI , 1985, 
to: 
B.L. Dart 
DART, ADAKSON, PARKEN & PRCODR 
310 South Main #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
er, Secretary 
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WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I #2535 
PACE, KLIMT. WUNDERLI & PARSONS AKK ^ 9 l935 
1200 University d u b Building
 nDr 
136 E a s t South Temple DRr-Al)-'-^ PRKN 6 PRCTft 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-cOo-
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CURT1S BECK ELTON, 
Defendant. 
A F F I D A V I T 
Civil No. 84-347 
consolidated with 
Civil No. 84-348 
(Judge Rigtrup) 
I, Joan H. Elton, being first duly sworn do hereby depose and say that: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter. 
2. A divorce trial was conducted between myself and the Defendant on 
or about the 19th day of March, 1985. 
3. A Decree of Divorce, as the final Judgment in that proceeding, was 
signed by the Court and filed with Tooele County Clerk's office on April 16/ 
1985. 
4. That as the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter at the time of 
the divorce trial I was pressured by my attorney, into the seJiLsnejvt, I did 
not agree with the context of the settlement and was told by my attorney that 




5. That I wear a hearing aide and cannot hear with out it, 
6. That on the day of the divorce trial I could not hear because my 
hearing aide was not functioning properly and because I had at that time a 
severe ear infection and I told my attorney, E.H, Fankhauser, of ny problem, 
asked him to seek a continuance and he refused insisting that the proceeding 
go forward anyway. 
1 . lhat irregularities in the proceeding of the Court occurred in that! 
the Defendant's counsel, B.L. Dart, had an extended conference with the Judge} 
before Plaintiff's counsel arrived at the Court. 
8« That the evidence is not sufficient in any form to support the 
decision as evidenced in the Decree of Divorce dividing the marital estate ir 
'th limited particularity the following is asserted: f 
A. ttiat the evidence was that the Tri-Plex acquired by the partie 
during the course of the marriage had a fair market value of 
well in excess of $80,000.00, that the evidence clearly 
* indicated that the Defendant contributed no more than 
$31,000.00 of monies brought in to the marriage to the 
acquisition of the Tri-Plex and that the Plaintiff was awarde 
\ only a $10,000.00 lien against the Tri-Plex therefore grantir 
V in excess of a $40,000.00 difference and a $30,000.00 windfa: 
\ to the Defendant. 
' B. That even if the Tri-Plex was valued at $68,000.00 the 
' arithmetical computation would indicate that the Defendant 
,' still accrued a two to one equity benefit in the distributic 
lot) 
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of that marital property. 
9. That considerable additional marital property was improperly 
valued and that the Defendant accrued substantial excessive distribution per 
the Decree. 
10. That the Plaintiff through the contribution of time, labor and 
monies during the course of this eight year marriage also made substantial 
contribution to the equity in the properties including the Tri-Plex which 
should have reduced the Defendant's disproportionate original investment to 
zero. 
U . That in essence the Defendant caused the Plaintiff's present 
physical disability to sane degree by virtue of the beatings and physical 
abuse that the Defendant subjected the Plaintiff to during the course of the 
marriager limiting the Plaintiff's capacity to sustain herself following the 
division of their matrimonial bonds and yet no alimony has been awarded by 
the Court and the Plaintiff asserts that this is a clear abuse of discretion 
entitling the Plaintiff alone under the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59(a) (1) to a new trial. 
Further the Affiant saith not. 
DMED this J£L dav nf *• ~ 'J , 1985. 
m H. ELTON / 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of _1985 
Notary Public/ 
Vtj Caimission Expires: 
_ 3-2M-81 Residing At: $>>L-G&<*KI* UJeJy 
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MAHJN3 CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Affidavit was mailed postage prepaid this £0_ day of fiOAA y 
1985, to: 
B.L. Dart 
DART, ADAMSON. PARKEN & PROCTOR 
310 South Main $1330 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
• • - - - • • - J ^ 
Secretary refci Gay Carter, ret* 
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B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo-
JOAN H. ELTON, t 
Plaintiff, : 
v. x 
CURTIS BECK ELTON, : 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
B. L, Dart, attorney for defendant Curtis Beck Elton, 
being first duly sworn, replies to plaintiff's affidavit as 
follows: 
1. In answer to paragraph 4 of plaintiff's affidavit, 
affiant is not aware of what discussions plaintiff had with her 
attorney but does represent that the settlement which was reached 
was reached after extensive negotiation; was fully read into the 
record in the presence of plaintiff and plaintiff at that time 
1 
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AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF 
Civil No. 84-347 
Judge Rigtrup 
represented to the Court that she understood and agreed to the 
terms of the settlement. 
2. In answer to the allegations of paragraph 6 of 
plaintiff's affidavit, affiant had an opportunity to observe, as 
did everybody else in the courtroom, plaintiff on the day of the 
trial and was able to observe that plaintiff engaged in 
conversation, responded to questions in an appropriate fashion 
and in every way demonstrated that she understood what was being 
said. No objection was made at the time of the hearing for a 
continuance based upon an ear infection or malfunction in 
plaintiff's hearing. 
3. In answer to the allegations of paragraph 7, 
affiant denies that any irregularities took place by reason of a 
meeting between the undersigned and Judge Kenneth Rigtrup. Prior 
to the arrival of either Judge Rigtrup or E. H. Fankhauser the 
court reporter, Gayle Campbell, had invited the undersigned into 
the District Court Judge's Chambers for a doughnut and a cup of 
coffee. The undersigned did not know that Judge Rigtrup was 
going to be coming into the chambers in view of the fact that the 
trial was scheduled in the Juvenile Court courtroom* While the 
undersigned was drinking his coffee, Judge Rigtrup did enter the 
room and there was general conversation concerning the weather, 
the drive to Tooele, the height of the Great Salt Lake, and the 
University of Utah basketball season. There was no discussion 
2 
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concerning the case between plaintiff and defendant including the 
merits of the case or any issues in the case. 
4. Affiant does not respond to the allegations 
contained in the remaining paragraphs of plaintiff's affidavit 
for the reason that those allegations contain representations on 
disputed issues of fact which never came on for trial before the 
Court by reason of the Stipulation reached between the parties 
and are not relevant to a request for relief under Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under circumstances where a 
Stipulation has been reached by the parties and accepted by the 
Court. 
DATED the day of May, 1985. 
B. L. DART 








I hereby certify that on the day of May, 1985, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit in Opposition to 
Affidavit of Plaintiff to: 
William B. Parsons III 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1200 University Club Bldg. 
136 East South Temple 





























C i v i l No. 84-347 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CURTIS BECK ELTON, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled case 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of 
the State of Utah, at Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah, 
on the 20th day of May, 1985, and the following proceedings 
were had. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff 
For the Defendant; 
William B. Parsons III, Esq. 
Pace, Klimt, Wunderli & Parso 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bert L. Dart, Esq. 
Dart, Adamson, Parken & Proct 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CAYLE B. CAMP2ELL 
A - 4 3 CtRllfliD SriORTHANO REPORTER 
. . . » • w c riTY UTAH 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: May we have Joan H. Eltpn 
versus Curtis Beck Elton, Civil No- 34-347. May we have 
your appearances for the record, please? 
MR. PARSONS: William Parsons in behalf 
of the petitioner, Joan Elton, your Honor. 
MR. DART: B. L. Dart on behalf of the 
defendant. Actually, two actions were filed and consolidated 
Under this action Mrs. Elton was the plaintiff, so in this 
proceeding we are representing the defendant. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Elton, why don!t you 
come up here where you can hear a little better. The record 
may reflect the presence of both plaintiff and defendant. 
You may proceed, Mr. Parsons. 
>!R. PARSONS: Thank you, your Honor. 
Your Honor, briefly, the petition as it has been submitted 
to the Court, the motion as it has been submitted to the 
Court is a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, 
a motion to amend the existing decree of divorce and findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. That is predicated upon the 
principles set forth in the Rules of Procedure, Rule 59(a) 
and 59(e). I would suggest that the basic concepts as set 
forth in the affidavit and in the motions themselves are 
well stated. I did not, however, at the time of the filing 
of the affidavit have particulars upon which to base the 
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motion beyond just in its roughest form. 
By way of presentation today, not to be excessive 
verbose, but if the Court would grant me the privilege of 
giving some particulars, I would like to quickly show what 
I consider to be the gross inequities in the distribution o 
marital assets for the purposes of then evidencing why we 
ought to go into a hearing. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. PARSONS: Thank you, your Honor. 
Your Honor, during the course of this marriage, the marriag 
having taken place in approximately 1977, there was a tri-
plex that was acquired that was a major portion of the 
marital estate. That triplex is mentioned in the affidavit 
That triplex is part of the decree and its distribution, 
and the triplex was given to the defendant, Mr. Elton. Mr. 
Elton, it is our understanding — and I'm working on a 
limited amount of information because of my newness in the 
case — but it's my understanding that Mr. Elton had the 
opportunity of contributing up to $31,000 worth of value to 
the repair and the acquisition cost of that triplex. The 
plaintiff, if having had the opportunity to present evidence 
would have presented evidence to show that that triplex was 
valued at $80,000 at the time of the divorce. Thirty-one 
from eighty is approximately $49,000, and Joan received a 
$10,000 lien against the interest in the divorce. 
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1 i It was the representation, and my understanding 
2 j is ~ 
3 j THE COURT: Ifm not sure that I'm track-
4 j ing you. Are you saying the triplex was free and clear? 
5 MR. PARSONS: Yes, and that there was 
6 $67,000 — I mean $80,000 worth of value equity, and that he 
7 contributed from pre-marital assets some $31,000. So that 
8 the marital equity amounted to approximately $49,000, and 
9 she got ten. 
10 Now, it was the defendant's position that the 
U triplex was worth less than $80,000. In fact, the defendant 
\2 indicated that, to the best of my knowledge, that the tri-
13 I plex was worth about $68,000. But even if it is sixty-
14 eight, thirty-one from sixty-eight gives you some $37,000, 
15 I and again, she got ten. And that would be a three-to-one 
16 distribution. 
17 Now, during the course or the life of this triplex 
18 with the marriage, Mr. Elton was in charge of the receipt 
19 of the rents, and received in excess of $31,000 in 1981, 
20 f 82, and '83 alone. In 1984 there was an additional sum of 
21 money that was received from rent, but the rents changed and 
22 j we don't know the exact figures. That $31,000 was used 
23 exclusively by Mr. Elton during the course of the marriage, 
24 and Mr. Elton maintained separate accounts. 
25 THE COURT: During which period of time? 
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1 . MR. PARSONS: During the marriage between' 
i 
























THE COURT: How much did he receive? 
MR. PARSONS: $31,680 for those three 
years, plus rents from the 1st of January of '85 through 
the time of the divorce. And they would have amounted to 
approximately $4,000 during that period of time. Roughly 
three and a half to four thousand dollars. That marital 
j 
asset was exclusively controlled and maintained in terms of 
the rent acquisition. Not the work that went into it, mind 
you, and not the responsibility for it. But in terms of the j 
use of the proceeds of the rent by Mr. Elton, the defendant I 
in this case, Mr. Elton maintained separate accounts. This j 
! 
marriage was a little different than your ordinary marriage ; 
and your economic basis in that he bought and sold what he [ 
j 
wanted to buy and sell, and we don't know what happened to j 
that $31,000. But we think that it went to his own purpose, ! 
and we believe we ought to have some distributive interest j 
in that thirty-one thousand plus. It's probably closer to 
thirty-five thousand with the 1985 rents on it. 
Now, your Honor, those are reasonably nebulous 
I 
concepts, but I'll be very specific in the following. During 
the course of the marriage there were bank accounts that 
were established, and Mrs. Elton received cash or cash 
equivalent stock certificates or cash in the amount of about { 
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$5,700. In fact, S5,754 at the time of the termination or 
this marriage. 
THE COURT: Fifty-seven what? 
MR. PARSONS: Fifty-seven fifty-four, 
sir. Mr. Elton received cash or cash equivalent amounting 
to $20,987 plus, in the form of his government retirement. 
And thatfs only marital contributions. In other words, the 
was part of the contribution that occurred only during the 
course of time when he was married. Half of that is $10,0( 
And he received cash or cash equivalent or use 
thereof over $20,000 at the time of the breakup of this 
marriage or at the time of the divorce. Now, relative to 
personal property — 
THE COURT: You're saying $20,000 in 
addition to the twenty thousand nine eighty? 
MR. PARSONS: No. Only the $20,987, 
sir, versus her $5,754. 
Now, in terms of the personal property distribut 
that was made at the time of this divorce, Mrs. Elton re-
ceived an equivalent for vehicles of $864, according to th 
figures prepared by Mr. Elton's counsel. And I'm led to 
believe — I don't know exactly who prepared these figures 
but I think that it was Mr. Elton's counsel. And Mr* Eltc 
received a value of $3,783 according to these computations 




1 I divorce. Mrs, Elton wears a hearing aid, is incapacitated, ' 
2 I had a hearing loss before the time that the marriage took 
3 I place, but had that hearing loss, it is her position, 
4 severely aggravated by physical abuse that occurred during 
5 the course of the marriage. And no alimony was awarded. 
I i 
i i 
6 I would suggest that the aggravation of the hear- ! 
7 ing loss has given rise to a set of circumstances that would i 
8 I have entitled her to alimony, even though she is receiving J 
9 | a payment from the United States Government in the form of » 
10 I a disability payment for having lost her hearing while she , 
j] was working. 
I i 
12 THE COURT: Has there been any medical j 
I i 
13 evaluation of her hearing loss? 
I ! 
14 MR. PARSONS: There has been a medical ; 
I 
15 J evaluation of the hearing loss, yes, sir. j 
16 I THE COURT: Is it rated any more j 
17 j severely now than what the Government rated it in compensat- . 
18 I ing her? , 
19 I MR. PARSONS: I don't bear the burden j 
20 of proof relative to that at this particular point. I only 
21 make the basic allegation. I do know there was abuse, or 
22 there is an allegation of — 
23 THE COURT: How do you know that? 
24 MR. PARSONS: The allegation. I say, 
25 that's the allegation, sir. And the allegation is that 
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there was no hearing aid apparatus required before the abuse 
took place. The abuse was in the nature of a slap against 
the head, an open-handed slap to the side of the head. And 
following that incident the hearing aid apparatus was re-
quired for any hearing. • 
Now, I've overlooked a good deal. I've given only j 
i 
i 
a sketchy concept, but I think basically the nature of the i 
rules are such, your Honor, that that's my responsibility at j 
this point. If I can show there is reason to believe, or ! 
if I can show prima facie evidence to show that it is reason-
I 
able to believe that there was a grossly disproportionate ; 
i 
distribution and that justice is not being served, then we ought to have the opportunity of re-opening the matter. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dart. 
MR. DART: My response, your Honor, is .; 
that we can respond to the specific allegations, and if the j 
Court desires, I'd be glad to do so. Mr. Parsons fails to 
i 
take into consideration substantial assets that she received j 
in the form of appreciation in the house that she's living j 
in and reduction of the mortgage balance against that of ; 
j 
right at $20,000. It fails to take into consideration the j 
inheritance that he received that was put into the triplex, 
and in fact the pre-marital assets exceeded the value of the j 
i 
triplex, as can be testified to by Jerry Roper, who is here 
. to testify as a witness at the trial, 
5 I Their argument fails to take into consideration 
a I that this case was set for trial and we were here on the da 
. | of trial and we were here prepared to try it, and through 
. the course of negotiations, a settlement was reached and 
fi that settlement was read into the record, and I would like 
- to offer at this time a copy of the transcript, 
g MR- PARSONS: We so stipulate that that 
9 did occur and that she was represented by counsel at that 
time. 
MR, DART: In which transcript the Cour 
can see that she was represented by competent counsel, Mr. 
Fankhauser, and a full stipulation was read into the record 
in the presence of both of the parties under circumstances 
where each of the parties were asked if they understood the 
.„ j stipulation and if they accepted the stipulation, and they 
17 did. And under circumstances during the proceedings v/here 
Mrs. Elton was responsive to questions and obviously track-
ing with the discussion, responding appropriately. And 
under the circumstances, there has been nothing raised toda 
that gives a basis for relief under Rule 59(a). The stipu-
22 I lation that was reached between the parties is evidentiary 
„ , information upon which the Court can rely in making a rulin 
i 
«4 and did so in signing the findings and decree tnat were pre 












basis that she didn't understand, didn't comprehend, and 
couldnft hear on the day of the proceeding. Your Honor was 
in attendance on that day, and I would like to just mention 
a few places in the transcript where it is obvious that she 
was tracking with the discussion. It was on page 4, and we 
were talking about lots that were located out here south of 
Wendover, Utah. And there was a question of which two lots 
she wanted to have, and the Court indicated on line 18, 
"plaintiff to have choice." And Mrs. Elton, in response to 
that, said, "Can I stipulate which ones later? I haven't 
seen the area." f 
* 
On the next page Mr. Fankhauser, on line 2, says, : 
t 
"Do you understand what he's saying? You get your choice 
within 30 days. Otherwise, he'll get the two in Block C . 
i 
and you'll get the two in Block D." ; 
"MRS. ELTON: It was my understanding they were j 
right in Wendover." j 
Further on the Court talks about a tax return for j 
i 
1984, on page 10, and the Court says on line 6; "All right. • 
What happens to the 1984 tax returns?" I indicate they have J 
not been filed and that it would be his intention to file : 
separately. And then Mr. Fankhauser, on line 12, turned to j 
his client and says, "Do you want to file separately?" And 
she said, "Yes." 
Finally, on page 11, the Court on line 5 says, j 
I 
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1 "Mrs, Elton, I assume you have heard what's been read into 
2 the record?" 
3 I "MRS, ELTON: Yes. 
4 "THE COURT: Do you understand those terms? 
5 "MRS, ELTON: Yes, 
6 "THE COURT: Do you agree to be bound by those 
7 terms? 
8 "MRS, ELTON: Yes." 
9 Under the circumstances, what we have here is a 
10 desire on the part of the plaintiff to renegotiate a settle-
11 ment. It is a seller's remorse situation/ which if allowed, 
12 would result in almost every case being upset because some-
13 one else# after reflection, decided that maybe they didn't 
14 j get as good a deal as they may have gotten. 
15 I submit that v/e have no basis under the rules 
16 for relief. The basis for relief under 59(a) is that there 
17 was, (a), an irregularity in the proceedings by which either 
18 party was prevented from having a fair trial. There is an 
19 allegation that your Honor and myself had discussions in 
20 chambers before the case. I filed an affidavit to the ef-
21 feet that that discussion was under circumstances where I had 
22 been invited for coffee and a doughnut, and related only to { 
23 I nontrial matters. And in any event, in view of the fact 
24 there was a full stipulation entared into, the Court made 
25 no rulings, nor could not have made any rulings on the case, 
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1 so there is no way by which that incident could have had in 
2 any way a bearing on whether she was prevented from having 
3 a fair trial. The rules provide a basis for relief on newly 
4 discovered evidence, but everything that's been talked of 
5 J today by Mr. Parsons as to the values in the properties, 
6 the amount of rents that Mr. Elton received — by the way, 
7 there were payments against the utilities and maintenance 
8 and mortgage payments, and the mortgage was down to a $900 
9 balance when the divorce action was filed and had been paid j 
{ 
10 I by the time of the divorce. But during the marriage, during | 
11 J the period when he received those rents, there was a mort-
12 gage balance. All that information was available. 
13 Now, it was not something that came to light after 
14 the fact. And as a result, I take the position that no 
15 relief under Rule 59(a) or (e) is being requested consistent 
16 with those rules, and that as such, that the motion ought to 
17 j be denied. With respect to the alimony issue, at the time 
I 
i 
18 I of the marriage of the parties Mrs. Elton was not working. ' 
19 At the time of the marriage she was drawing a disability 
20 check for a hearing impairment, and the circumstances are 
21 the same at the present time that she is continuing to draw 
22 I that disability payment and is not working, although had 
23 there been a trial we would have adduced evidence that she, 
24 during the marriage, had employment at Kelly Girl, had been 
25 able to carry on employment, but in fact was spending most o^ 
I j her time involved with her father's affairs in connection 
i 
, ! with real estate holdings that he has here in Tooele County, 
*• i 
And as such, the Court's determination of no alimony but a 
property settlement paying her $300 a month for a $10,000 













By way of rebuttal to Mr. Dart's comments, Mr. j 
Dart first mentioned the concept of Mrs. Elton*s home equity j 
reduction and cited the Court approximately $20,000 mortgage j 
•I | reduction. j 
l7 ! MR. DART: No; five thousand reduction, ! 
I j 
la ! fifteen thousand enhancement. • 
i }-
14 i MR. PARSONS: I wanted to — they had j 
15 made the allegation that there was a $15,000 enhancement in j 
i ! 
Ig value during the course of the marriage in the document they j 
i 
17 , had originally prepared,, and in fact there was $4,500 in \ 
. I 
; I 
j g « mortgage reduction during the course of their marriage. j 
! i 
19 ; However, we would also point out to the Court that j 
20 ! Mrs. Elton singularly paid that mortgage entirely and paid j 
21 
i 





THE COURT: That doesn't really matter , 
who reduces it, does it? 
MR. PARSONS: No. But there was only a 
$4,500 reduction. 
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1 I THE COURT: I understand. 
2 MR. PARSONS: There is a concept of the
 : 
•3 existence of the hearing loss, and whether or not Mrs. Elton j 
I j 
4 could or could not perceive all that was going forth. T * 
I * 
i i 
5 have in my possession a doctor's letter indicating that Mrs. j 
6 Elton, on the day after this proceeding, went to her hearing j 
7 doctor for purposes of assisting her in acquiring better ' 
8 hearing because she was not at that time capable of hearing j 
9 well* I have the hearing test results, in fact, but I only j 
10 received those this morning and I cannot discern them. I [ 
11 can't tell to what degree she had a hearing impairment, but j 
12 the report itself does say that she had to come in because j 
13 she couldn't hear, and that he had to help her because of j 
• * 
14 her not being able to hear. And this was the day after — I 
I ! 
I ' 
15 THE COURT: Generally, discussions • 
16 concerning settlement didn't take place in the presence of j 
17 the Court• Mr* Dart did get here early, and there were some | 
j 
18 j doughnut old maids, or whatever they were. I don't know j 
i 






ends from Salt Lak  Doug nut,  whatever. They w re a lit- j 
tie hard and stale, as far as I recall. ; 
i 
MRS. ELTON: Your Honor, could you speak | 
up, please, or talk into the speaker? 
THE COURT: Can you hear me now? 
MRS. ELTON: A little better, thank you. 
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on my desk, Mr. Dart was invited to have a doughnut. The 
case was not discussed. And then v/hen Mr. Fankhauser ar-
rived, I generally discussed the case with Mr. Fankhauser 
and Mr. Dart outside the presence of the parties, and there 
was an inventory list of a lot of personalty.which I didn't 
pay really much attention to. I addressed the issues of her 
having a home prior to the marriage, and I discussed the 
issue of the triplex, and it was represented — I don't re-
member the figures exactly, except I do recall the fact 
that he put some $30,000, or received some $30,000 from a
 ( 
home he sold at or about the time of the marriage, which 
principally went into the triplex. And I discussed the issue 
of him having some increased value in his retirement system. 
And without getting into any nuts and bolts, I simply sua- J 
gested that it appeared to the Court that Mrs. Elton would j 
be entitled to something, and suggested that Mr* Dart make 
some sort of a cash offer or a payment sort of offer. And j 
as I recall, that figure was $10,000. I don't recall any of i 
r 
the details. j 
i 
Thereafter, the attorneys left my office and j 
i 
t 
talked with both parties about the matter. I was not in- i 
volved in any detailed discussions at that point. And 
assuming you were totally deaf, Mrs. Elton, Ifve dealt with 






a slow and laborious process, but I have communicated to • 
them with my legal pad and pen. And I have a hard time ; 
understanding why, if you don't have full details at hand, 
i 
why you couldn't communicate with Mr. Fankhauser in writing, 
if nothing else. The Court didnft come out in the courtroom/ 
t 
; 
didn't direct the proceedings in any way, shape or form, 
and so I wasn't involved in those details. 
I think the record, if there is one, generally 
bears that out. We didn't discuss a great deal of detail — j 
I haven't read the transcript, but I don't recall that they j 
went through the nuts and bolts of the settlement offer in my; 
presence at all. 
MR. DART: At the time that the settle-
ment had been reached, we then, in chambers, went on the 
record and read the stipulation. But before that point, your 
Honor is correct. | 
I 
THE COURT: I do have the recollection j 
that the offer was made or the $10,000 figure was discussed ! j 
in my presence * As far as I understand it, that was a start-! 
i 
ing point. Mr. Fankhauser and his client were certainly in j 
a position to counter. I did discuss with both counsel that ; 
§ 
I generally was philosophically inclined to follow the 
rationale of the Preston v. Preston case, which simply 
recognized that parties in cases of second marriage that had 
pre-existing estates brought them into the marriage, and thatj 
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16 
they were restored to that position and were entitled to 
that property back plus the appreciable gain on that prop-
erty* And it was within the context of those statements 
that the parties addressed the settlement negotiations. 
MR. PARSONS: I don!t have any sub-
stantial dispute with what the Court has indicated. In fad 
that really isn't the basis for my motion. We may or may 
not be successful relative to the motion# but certainly the 
fundamental basis of the motion is that there is such a 
disproportionate — a careful examination would show that 
there is an incredibly disproportionate distribution of 
assets, and as a result, there is an insufficiency of evi-
dence to substantiate the award as it exists. Now, I think 
that even though it may well be a strained concept, it 
nevertheless falls within the provisions of Rule 59(a)(6), 
insufficient evidence to justify the verdict. Ordinarily 
I understand the verdict would be a result of evidence sub-
mitted and adduced from a presentation on the merits and 
not as a result of settlement negotiations. The fact that 
Mrs. Elton has evidenced her dissatisfaction with the rep-
resentation that has taken place is neither here nor there. 
It is evidence that she would have done something differ-
ently. My point is that that did not occur. It is up to 
the Court today to determine, I believe, whether we do or 






1 we are entitled. And frankly, I think we do, I think that ! 
2 the prima facie presentation of the disproportionate distri-
3 bution is sufficient to put us within that provision, j 
4 j Now, even if we don't, sir — even if we do not, 
I i 
5 the Court has continuing jurisdiction over the distribution 
6 of assets in a marital estate, and we fall clearly within j 
7 the provisions of 59(e) in that we were timely, you do have ! 
8 continuing jurisdiction, and if there is an inequity that j 
9 I've evidenced to the Court, then we ought to be entitled to I 
10 a hearing to justify — [ 
11 THE COURT; I'm not sure you have evi~ \ 
I § 
I t 
12 denced an inequity. If the substantial portion of his sale j 
15 proceeds went into the triplex, and if he had inheritance 
I • 
14 payments during the marriage — j 
I i 
I i 
15 MR. PARSONS: That didn't go into the j 
i 
16 | triplex. 
17 THE COURT: It went into various marital 
18 assets. 
19 MR. PARSONS: We dispute that. We don't 
20 think he. has put anything of his inheritance into the marital* 
21 assets. 
22 THE COURT: Where did the inheritance 
23 go? 




1 THE COURT: How much was the inheritai 
2 figure? 
3 MR. DART: The inheritance was — agai 
4 if we've got a dispute of fact, then the time to raise it 
5 was at the time of trial. But in any event, the inheritar 
6 that he received was $5,000 inheritance, and at the same 
7 time he borrowed from his mother $19,000. That loan was r 
8 repaid until his motherfs death, and then was taken as a 
9 diminution of the estate. So it was sort of a pre-inherit 
10 amount, but it did go into the triplex. There was a home 
11 sold for $35,000, then after selling costs there was $31,C 
12 in proceeds, so our position would be that he had a $35,0C 
13 asset and he should get $35,000 credit. 
14 THE COURT: Well, at this point, withe 
15 some more critical analysis, I don't see — I don't see, c 
16 the face of things, the shocking disprooortionateness of i 
17 unless you can show me wherein the Court had some misunder 
18 standing. I was operating on the assumption that he had 
19 substantial proceeds from the sale of a home, that he had 
20 substantial inheritance moneys or family moneys that by an 
21 large carried the triplex. And there may be some differen 
22 in value. She had a home as well that she brought into th 
23 marriage, and without going through detailed accountings, 
24 which the Court didn't, the only other asset that had any 
25 greatly enhanced value, other than the two pieces of 
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1 property was the retirement, ! 
2 MR. PARSONS: There is a third piece of 
a real estate which also went to the defendant, Mr. Elton. 
4 That third piece of real estate and all of its equity were 
5 to his benefit, although the equities there were not sub- j 
6 stantial. But it is in that particular piece of real estate I 
I i 
I i 
7 j that a portion of his proceeds of his inheritance, if we j 
8 I understood it correctly, went. But that the triplex# o n i 
I » 
9 maybe as much as a five-to-one ratio, or maybe as little as j 
I ! 
i 
10 a three-to-one ratio, went disproportionately to the de- ! 
11 fendant. It is our position that the personal property, on 
12 at least a three-to-one ratio, went to the defendant, and 
13 the checking accounts and cash and cash equivalent accounts 
14 on as much as a five- or six-to-one ratio went to the de-
15 fendant, 
16 THE COURT: Do you have any evidence at 
17 all to present to this Court to suggest that the capital 
I 
i » 
18 j investment that went into the triplex wasn't substantially j 
19 I all his, and that — 
20 MR. PARSONS: The original capital in-
21 vestment was his. j 
i 
22 I THE COURT: All right. And that appreci-j 
23 ation thereon, to a large extent, was attributable as a 
24 profit or return from that contribution? 
25 MR. PARSONS: Yes, sir. I can address 
20 
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1 that issue. 
2 THE COURT: And building up that value? 
3 MR. PARSONS: Yes, sir. That issue, I 
4 can address. 
5 I believe the concept is distinguishable between 
I i 
[ I 
6 the original investment capital and the appreciation on the ! 
7 property. It was basically garbage at the time they bought I 
! ; 
8 it. It was really deterioriated property. He only paid ; 
9 something like $23,000 for a triplex, in whole, or the v/hole i 
10 unit. And then they went in together and they rebuilt it ! 
I I 
I : 
11 and they worked on it together. And Mr. Elton did a ton of I 
! 
12 work, Mrs. Elton did a lot of work, and the rebuilding of i 
i 
13 this property was a marital endeavor of the parties. It j 
14 truly was. Sir, your analysis is correct, that it was the * 
i 
15 original capital investment of the defendant, not the plain- j 
16 tiff, that gave rise to the opportunity. But the oppor-
17 tunity would never have flourished had it not been for the 
18 mutual endeavor of both plaintiff and defendant. And that i 
j 
19 mutual endeavor enhanced the property in excess of three ! 
i 
20 times its original purchase price. It was bought for \ 
21 twenty-three, and if our evidence showed that there was a • 
22 market value of eighty, which would be more than three times 
23 the value at the end of the marriage. And that's in a 
24 short period of time when my real estate was going to pot. 
25 I have some considerable experience in recognizing the naturd 
21 
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1 of the depreciation that took place in 1981, 1982 and 1983. ; 
2 I And theirs markedly increased, and it could only do that by 
3 virtue of change in the basic character of that which j 
I t 
4 j existed. And that change of character was attributable to 
i i 
5 the two people, not to the one. So I don't think that you 
S can attribute the theory that anything that is otherwise 
1 associated with that which he brought into the marriage 
J j vis-a-vis the triplex issue, goes back to him* Because that 
> wasn't the way it took place. 
I I Again, your Honor, I submit that the appropriate 
thing — and I do not wish to belabor it — but I would sub- * 
mit that the appropriate thing would be to set aside the \ 
existing decree, hold an evidentiary hearing and make an ? 
order accordingly. i 
I 
MR* DART: If the Court will allow me ! 
to respond, looking at the triplex as one asset misconstrues 
the totality of all the assets. And as I say, there is 
a disregarding of the $20,000 enhancement she had in the 
home that she kept. There is a disregarding of the money 
that did come from the inheritance and a loan from his mother 
i 
that was used to upgrade the triplex from its original pur-
 t 
i 
chase price. We did prepare and have submitted to the Court . 
an exhibit that we were going to rely upon at trial, which j 
j 
under our approach would have put him in a posture of having 
$4,000 and with a proposal of $2,000 paid from him to her 
22 
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to balance those equities. Because of the negotiations, 
that figure went from $2,000 to $10,000, and that's where 
it stayed. What bothers me that they are saying that based 
upon her own stipulation, under evidence available to her 
at the time, she now doesn't like it and she ought to be 
able to come in and ask for a new trial. I submit that's 
not a basis under the rules. I have a case of Kline v. 
Kline, where an attempt was made to set aside a stipulation 
i 
i 
under circumstances where the husband said he didn't under- ! 
i 
stand what was being done. The court found that the trial j 
S 
court's refusal to set it aside was appropriate, and that j 
the court under all the considerations and using the stipula-! 
i 
i 
tion could have made the ruling that it did. And whether » 
to set it aside is within the discretion of the court, but 
i 
there's got to be some rational basis. Here there is none ; 
i 
except, as I say, for remorse that on reflection it wasn't | 
the deal that she wanted. 
MR. PARSONS: I just want to point out, 
finally, that as long as there is no final judgment, and the 
i judgment is not final as long as we have filed within the { 
provisions of the rules, which we did, there is no final ; 
t 
judgment and the Court unquestionably has the discretion to j 
either re-enter the case or not re-enter. So it's a Question 
of whether we have or have not given sufficient reason for 




I*11 submit it. ; 
MR. DART: We'll submit it. 
THE COURT: With respect to the trial of • 
t 
the matter, there were no communications to the Court as 
to the plaintiff's underlying disability to go forward with ; 
any trial. There were no requests made of the Court to I 
continue the matter. The matter had been noticed up for 
some several weeks, had been set for trial, and it appeared 
to the Court that both parties were present in person, were 
represented by competent counsel, and were prepared to go 
forward with the trial. 
The matter of evaluation, I'm not sure what the 
evidence would have been from either party with respect to 
value. I heard one or both attorneys, at least, and I take 
it from what Mr. Dart has said that he at least had an j 
! 
appraiser present to testify as to the value of the property J 
! 
There's nothing in the way of surprise to either 5 
i 
party. They knew what the pieces of real property were. It j 
was apparent to both of them that there was a triplex, that j 
there was a home that Mrs. Elton occupied, and that of ! 
i 
recent time during the separation period and shortly beiore j 
i 
trial, that Mr. Elton had acquired a new home which was sub-
stantially mortgaged, and there would have been little, if 
any, independent generation of equity in. It was obvious 
who his employer was, and it was obvious that with little or 
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1 j no trouble one could ascertain v/hat the increase in value 
2 was in the federal retirement from the date of the marriage 
3 to the date of divorce. Those things, I don't think, are 
4 j difficult to value. They were the substance of the marital 
5 estate, with the exception of a lot of toys, as are character 
6 ized by Mrs. Elton. 
7 j And because those were known to the parties/ there 
8 appears to be nothing that the Court's been made aware of 
9 that was overlooked or is a matter of oversight. It would 
10 appear to the Court that there is no substantial basis for 
11 granting a new trial or amending the stipulation at this 
12 point. 
13 MR. PARSONS: Thank you, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
15 MR. DART: Thank you, your Honor. I'll 
16 prepare an order. 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 I State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
3 j County of Salt Lake ) 
4 I, Gayle B. Campbell, do hereby certify: 
5 That I am one of the Official Court Reporters of 
6 the State of Utah; that on the 20th day of iMay, 1985, I | 
7 attended the within matter and reported in shorthand the 
8 proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said short-
9 I hand notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and the fore- j 
10 I going pages, numbered from 1 to 25, inclusive, constitute a 
H full, true and correct account of the same to the best of my 
12 ability. 
13 Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this day of 
14 July, 1985. 
15 
16 
Gayle B. Campbell 
17 I Court Reporter 










B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




s Civil No. 84-347 




Plaintifffs Motion for a New Trial or in the Alternate 
to Amend Judgment entered in this action came on regularly for 
hearing on the 20th day of May, 1985, at the hour of 1:00 p.m., 
plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney William B. 
Parsons III, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorn 
B. !•• Dart, and the Court having heard argument from respective 
counsel, and the transcript from the divorce proceeding having b 
offered and received as an exhibit, and the Court having reviewe 
the presentations and being fully advised, 
1 
JOAN H. ELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CURTIS BECK ELTON, 
Defendant. 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff Joan H. Elton's 
Motion for a New Trial and her Motion in the Alternative to Amend 
the Judgment are both denied. 
DATED this day of , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of May, 1985, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to: 
William B. Parsons III 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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